Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana Essay Example for Free

Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana EssayLate Monday morning on August 29, 2005 a little more than than 4 hours after Katrina slammed into New siege of Orleans, and just hours after arriving in Baton Rouge, FEMA director and Bush the Youngers childhood friend Michael Brown conducted a video conference apprise with the President who sat and listened quietly in Crawford Texas. Brown emphatically relayed to Bush, This is, to put it mildly, the big one, I think. Then Brown indulgent his fear that the government might non gain the capacity to respond to a catastrophe within a catastrophe The Superdome, he s instigate was not equipped to be a refuge of last resort. The President asked no questions (A. P. 2006). Although Brown did a fairly decent job of trying to convey the potentially devastating nature of what was occurring, the echt problem was that Brown had not been on the ground in Louisiana long enough to accurately understand the unfeigned impact of the storm (Brinkley 2006) . By the time that he would come to realize that his lack of experience was simply no match for the enormity of this disaster, it may have been too late. The storm would ultimately leave 1,322 people dead, and 2,ccc people missing in its wake (A. P. 2006).Two years later, in the autumn of 2007, FEMA and Michael Brown would be called upon again. First water and now fire had come to claim the day. What a difference a disaster would make. In the early afternoon of Tuesday October 23, 2007, at the southwest D. C. offices of the Federal Emergency Management Administration, FEMA Deputy Administrator Admiral Harvey E. Johnson stepped up to a podium. He was there to give the national media a 1PM sign up briefing on the calcium round the bend fires that were currently raging throughout a large swath of land and threatening homes from Santa Barbra County to the US-Mexican border.The fires had been raging for three days. In time, they would absorb the largest civilian evacuation in the Uni ted States history, as one million residents of seven California counties were force to leave their homes. While the camera feeds fed the press conference to Fox News and MSNBC along with a few other news agencies, Johnson began fielding questions of a common variety. Someone wanted to know or so the traffic of commodities coming into California. Another person asked how FEMA would deal with people who refused to evacuate.Then another person asked the Deputy Administrator Are you happy with FEMAs solution so far? And yet another one asked Are there each lessons to be learned from Katrina? I am very happy with FEMAs response so far, Johnson said its a very smoothly, very efficiently performing team And so I think what youre really eyesight here is the benefit of experience, the benefit of good leadership and the benefit of good disruptnership, no(prenominal) of which were present in Katrina. (Kamen 2007) Johnson spoke like a true professional, answer all of their questions with a unique sense of cordiality.However, this was precisely because none of these people asking the questions were actually reporters at all. This was a staged event It was not real Due to fact that the Deputy Administrators office had botched the scheduling of this event, and real pool reporters were sole(prenominal) afforded a 15 minutes notice, none of them were able to show up. The FEMA staff decided to fake a move (Ibid). Thus, while the cameras that were hooked up to their dedicated feeds were rolling in earnest, this was all a lie. Two day later, the gig was upThis ill-conceived stunt gained a staring role in the next few news cycles, which only served to channel back the haunting memories of the striking ineptness displayed by FEMA during the wrath of Hurricane Katrina. This immediately prompted Homeland Security Chief Michael Chertoff to comment, I think it was one of the dumbest and most strange things Ive seen since Ive been in government (MSNBC 2007). White House P ress Secretary Dana Perino was a bit more subdued in her criticism, It is not a practice that we would employ here at the White House or that we we certainly dont condone it (Ibid).However, this was about as far as the analogies and the memories would be allowed to go. Twenty-four hours before Katrina made landfall, a FEMA executive in Denton Texas turned down a Red High Priority plea for 300 Rubber Boats from the Louisiana Department of Wild Life and Fishing. The official simply scrawled REQUEST DENIED across the top of the document (Brinkley 2006). FEMA as well as turned down a U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service offer to save the lives of people who may have been stranded in Orleans, St. Bernard, and St. Tammany parishes.Furthermore, from his community in West Palm Beach Florida, articulation Mark Foley offered airplanes that were on the ready to evacuate victims. So too, he was turned down as well. So it went with a host of reports stating that FEMA seemed strangely ambivalent to any kind of aid for Katrina victims (Ibid). Five months later, the Senate Homeland Security Committee which oversees the Department of Homeland Security of which FEMA is a part, released over 800,000 pages of memos, emails, strategy plans, and intradepartmental correspondence.These now world documents tell the shocking story of a government agency rife with ineptness. That Sunday before the storm, the U. S Department of the Interior offered substantial material aid of the sort that would naturally be needed in any disaster of this kind. They were also turned down. Senate Homeland Security Chairwoman Senator Susan Collins (R-Main) bristled at these findings, That is incredible to me she said (Ibid). No one seemed to understand why FEMA would turn down aid with a catastrophe of this magnitude, especially when it was being offered from a calculate of its own peer agencies.Even more riveting was the slew of reports that the U. S. government was refusing the massive amounts of aid off ered from capitals around the world. From millions of dollars from citizens and governments in Europe, to barrels of oil from Venezuela and 1600 disaster adroit physicians from Cuba the snubbing of this aid was mind-boggling (Ibid). Whats more, rumors continue to abound even until this day, after more than three years, of shocking scenes of official neglect that existed in New Orleans during those horror-filled hours in the immediate aftermath of Katrina.Stories of widespread police brutality and even White vigilantes hunting down Blackfolk, have become just one part of an International Tribunal on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita which has aimed the majority of its widespread enmity towards FEMA (Langley 2007). The tornadoes of despair have not ceased for the victims of Katrina, and the heartache still abounds as well. Twenty-six months later, after wildfires went wild in California, FEMA Administrator David Paulison stepped forward immediately to tell the American People, The safety o f the firefighters, individuals and families in the impacted areas is of utmost concern. (FEMA 2007). Contrary to the widespread sense of government skip that many felt in response to Katrina, the victims of the California Wildfires were immediately afforded a sense of assurance that FEMA was working with the highest sense of urgency on their behalf. Victims of this disaster were right away promised that this would not be a repeat of Katrina (Philbin 2007). So it was, that with amazing efficiency, within hours FEMA had approved grants that allowed the state of California to recoup as much as 75% of the cost of fighting the wildfires.They had a joint field office open within 48 hours. FEMAs regional office in California also stayed open 24/7, and coordinated its efforts with state, local, and federal agencies, including the Department of the Interior, D. O. T, the Army Corps of Engineers, Health and Human Services, and the U. S. Forest Service (EKU October 24, 2007). FEMA put its r esources on full approach for the residents of Southern California, opening shelters, handing out blankets, food and water. From Katrina in August of 2005 to the California Wildfires of 2007 it was as if we were watching a Tale of Two Cities.One can only hope that FEMA keeps itself together and that tragedies coupled with that kind of governmental ineptitude never happen again. References Associated Press (March 1, 2006) (Video File) Washingtonpost. com Katrina the warnings bush received. Retrieved from http//www. washingtonpost. com/wp- dyn/content//video/2006/03/01/V12006030101864 hypertext mark-up language Brinkley, Douglas The great flowage Hurricane katrina, new orleans, and the mississippi gulf coast. Harper Collins 2006 334-335, 250 CNN (Tuesday October 23, 2007) Lessons from Katrina being applied to fire response. Updated 829 PM Retrieved from htt//www. cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/10/fire. fema/index. html EKU onset Chief (website) (Oct 24, 2007) FEMA responds to california wi ldfires. Retrieved from http//firechief. com/leadership/incident- command/Fema_wildfire_10242007/ FEMA (October 24, 2007) Contingency Planning and Management Federal emergency management agency coordinating national response to California wildfires. Retrieved from http//www. contingencyplanning. com/articles/52388/ Kamen, A (October 26, 2007) Washington Post FEMA meets the press Which happens to be fema. p. A19 Langley, D (July 22, 2007) Workers World Katrina-Rita tribunal to focus on u. s.crimes Retrieved from http//www. workers. org/2007/us/katrina-rita-0726/ MSNBC (Saturday October 27, 2007) Chertoff blast FEMAs faux press conference. Calls agencys use of fake reporters one of the dumbest things hes seen. Updated 721 PM. Retrieved At http//www. msnbc. com/id21490838/ Philbin, P (October 24, 2007) (transcript) California wildfires fema responds. path vows aggressive effort on wildfires. Washington Post. com. External Affairs Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency. Retrieve d At http//www. washingtonpost. com/wp- dyn/content/discussion/2007/10/24/DI2007102400890. html